Benchmarking of e-government and the information society is a booming business. This phenomenon raises several interesting questions. Why does this particular part of the Information and Communications Technology (ICT) world receive so much of this type of attention? Why are there so many benchmarks? What do they purport to measure? Who reads these and how much credence is given to them? Do they play a valuable role in advancing e-government and e-society or is their impact actually negative? This article looks at these and a number of related questions including the degree of consistency between different benchmarks, trends over time and the importance or otherwise that governments place on these reports. From this, some tentative theories about the role of benchmarking, the pressures that benchmarks place on public managers and their significance are proposed and some limitations of benchmarks are identified and discussed.
Introduction
Benchmarking is as old as history. The human urge to compare one's performance with that of others seems to be an intrinsic part of our psychological make-up. In his hierarchy of needs Maslow (1954) notes that when basic requirements for food, safety and group acceptance are met, the next human need is self-esteem which in most instances can be translated as recognition and status. There is an in-built drive to establish one's position in the tribe. As with individuals, so with teams, organizations, companies and countries. League tables constantly tell us not only which country has the highest GDP per capita and the fastest economic growth rate, but which nation is happiest, whose citizens live longest, have the highest infant mortality rate and so on.
Since the beginning of this century, a particularly favoured subject for benchmarking has been e-government. For a number of years now, at least three e-government benchmarks have been published each year as well as a regular stream of one-off measurements. The objectives of these benchmarks will be discussed below, but at this point it is sufficient to say that they vary in scope and purpose. In addition to e-government benchmarks, there is also a large and growing body of related activities including benchmarks of phenomena like the information society and ereadiness as well as many e-government evaluation exercises.
In this context, it is worth discussing briefly what is meant by 'e-government'. A popular conception of e-government is that it is about the delivery of government services over the Internet in general and the Web in particular. At the other end of the spectrum, another school of thought defines e-government as any use of ICT in public administration and services. A pragmatic definition lies between these two extremes. There is more to e-government than the Web, but at the same time, including the civil service payroll under the heading e-government does not make much sense. One working definition is that e-government is the use of ICT in the formulation and execution of government and public policy. The OECD (2003) has defined e-government as the use of ICTs in public administration to achieve innovative forms of government and governance. Both of these definitions imply that many, behind-the-scenes computer systems and applications are part of e-government and this, as will be seen, creates problems for would-be benchmarkers.
The focus of this study is deliberately narrow. It is concerned only with benchmarking and only with e-government. Other contributions to the literature (see below) use a wider canvas and encompass other aspects of electronic society generally. The purpose of this article is confined to asking, and trying to answer, two principal questions:
1. Are the effects of benchmarks beneficial? 2. If so, who are the beneficiaries?
The answer to these questions will, in turn, provoke further questions some of which will be addressed in what follows, others of which must be left for another day.
The structure of this article is as follows. First some practical problems with benchmarks are discussed. This is followed by a simple taxonomy of benchmarks and a brief review of published benchmarks. The focus will be will be on that small class of benchmarks which is, or has been, published on a regular basis as this group is the most politically significant. Next some conceptual problems with benchmarking will be outlined and some critiques of the eEurope benchmark in the literature reviewed. A further analysis of the latter benchmark in the light of the theoretical and practical problems of benchmarking will lead to a brief conclusion and reflection on its value.
Some practical problems with benchmarks
In the introduction, several examples of common benchmarks were mentioned. When these types of comparison involve single and readily measured or counted variables, they are easy to undertake. Figures such as infant mortality rates or miles of motorway per capita are straightforward to compile and the data to do so are usually available from government agencies. However, once one moves away from such simple situations, comparisons become more complicated in two distinct ways:
G Any ranking system needs a final single scale and the ability to compute a score on that scale. When the number of variables in a comparison exceeds one, a method of arriving at such a score must be decided and there are usually no fixed or agreed rules for this. A third problem is the continued availability of data. What happens if the government stops collecting a piece of data or the definition of a variable changes? A related problem is that some public services may have no meaning in certain countries which makes comparisons more difficult or even meaningless.
The would-be benchmarker faces other practical problems. If data are not readily available (from, say, a government agency or an industry body) they will need to be collected. If this has to be done on any scale (say in 20 or more countries), the cost of such an exercise can rise rapidly unless some automated web-scraping system will do the job. The more subtle and complex the data, the greater the cost. For example, it is relatively easy to establish how many citizens in a country are connected to broadband; it takes a good deal more work to establish the use to which they put this facility. This is not a methodological problem. There is no shortage of methods for collecting such data: surveys, focus groups, interviews and so on are highly effective ways of gathering data, but they all cost money. Which naturally leads to the questions: who pays for this work and what return do they expect from their investment? Cui bono? Sometimes this is clear. For example, it is common in certain industries for companies to contribute to an industry association of some sort which will undertake regular surveys of important parameters such as unit sales or output per employee. Each contributor then gets an assessment of its performance relative to the group. This might show, for example, the industry average unit cost of production or the member's market share. This information is valuable to companies, which is why they are prepared to pay for it. Are governments willing to pay to be told that their e-government is ranked 14th in Europe? It is not obvious that they are.
A would-be benchmarker of e-government therefore either needs to find a way to fund such an exercise or needs some commercial justification to fund it themselves. To benchmark e-government on any scale and to an acceptable level of quality takes reasonably deep pockets and the deepest pockets often belong to the state. There are, of course, reasons why states, individually or collectively, may wish to benchmark their e-government. Some of these are discussed below. But one of the questions that this article seeks to explore is what benchmarks actually tell ordinary citizens, and those who commission the benchmarks, about the real state of e-government. Once this is understood, it should be possible to understand why one finds the type of benchmarking one does, or more to the point one does not, find when looking at international comparisons of e-government.
Benchmarking concepts
A review of the literature and relevant web sites reveals two interesting characteristics of this topic. First, there is a surprisingly large number of benchmarks available (see Kunstelj and Vintar, 2004 , for a good, if not fully up-to-date, list). Several of these are discussed later in this article. Second, there is surprisingly little in the academic literature on this subject. An extensive search uncovered a large number of papers on benchmarking everything from hospitals to critical success factors, but only a modest subset of this considered the conceptual and practical problems of benchmarking e-government. In a European context, two useful articles appeared in the same edition of Information Polity in 2004. The first of these, Janssen et al. list 18 benchmarks including some local Belgian ones. The second article, referred to above, by Kustelj and Vintar, is based on a number of years of research and presents a more detailed critique of a range of benchmarks and evaluation studies. The authors go on to propose a new model for e-government evaluation. Ojo et al. (2005) and Jansen (2006) also present alternative models.
In their article, Janssen et al. (2004) classify the 18 benchmarks that they classify into four categories:
G Supply studies;
G Demand studies;
G Information society studies; G e-Government indicator studies. Kunstelj and Vintar (2004) identify 41 reports, not all of them benchmarks, which they group differently as: Unlike Janssen et al.'s classification, these groups are not mutually exclusive and a report can fall into several categories. (A point worth noting is that each of these lists contains a number of local studies, in the case of Janssen et al. from Belgium and the Netherlands, in the case of Kunstelj and Vintar, from Slovenia. The implication is that a study done in, say, Sweden or Spain would identify similar local studies which may not be visible to researchers in other countries unless they were published on the Web and in English or another language accessible to the researchers.) A problem with both of these groups of categories is that they are inconsistent, i.e. items on the above lists are not strictly comparable. When it comes to benchmarking, it is important to be clear about what precisely it claims to measure. A benchmark must measure something. A fuller list of possibilities might include:
G Gain (outputs relative to inputs);
Each of these has, in turn, many possible subheadings. Inputs can be measured in terms of the resources invested in e-government, outputs in terms of range of services, number of web sites, number of pages available and so on. Others raise more difficult questions. What is meant by 'effectiveness' and how might we measure it for e-government? For example, one aspect of effectiveness is integration of servicesa key objective of e-government. While it is by no means impossible to define a metric for this, doing so is not trivial. Finding a metric which can be used with equal meaning in several different jurisdictions is challenging to say the least.
Jansen (2006) explores what he describes as the drawbacks in current benchmarks, noting that they do not always adapt well to local contexts and national priorities although he does not develop this thesis very far. He proposes a threedimensional view: democratic, service and administrative. Ojo et al. (2005) compare three different surveys, those by the United Nations (UN), Accenture and Brown University to distil out a 'core' set of indicators. Another, fairly intricate, approach to measuring e-services is proposed by Vintar et al. (2004) . While the problem of the efficacy of benchmarks is mentioned in each of these articles, none really confronts it head on.
A taxonomy of benchmarks
Benchmarks of e-government can be classified in a number of ways. These include:
Under the first heading, there are four current benchmarks of e-government that are, or have been, published on a regular basis, namely:
G The eEurope (Capgemini) There are also several other benchmarks, most of which are one-off as well as some that have been published more than once, but then stopped. Some of the latter are discussed below. Second, four different source categories must be differentiated:
G Independent, commissioned benchmarks and reports. These are paid for and carried out by, or on behalf of, a government, a state agency, a research institute or a supra-governmental body. Whatever their other merits or demerits, they are normally designed to meet a specific research objective rather than serve a commercial or private agenda. The prime example here is the series of Capgemini eEurope reports (Cap Gemini, Ernst & Young, 2001 , 2003a , 2003b , 2003c Capgemini, 2005 Capgemini, , 2006 G Benchmarks that are undertaken for marketing reasons. The most important of these is the series of Accenture reports (Accenture, 2000 (Accenture, -2006 . These reports, while professionally carried out, have, as one of their objectives, raising the profile of the company concerned in the e-government services market. While these are not likely to be biased in terms of their comparisons, their focus will tend to be on areas of commercial interest to the authors.
G Benchmarks carried out for academic research purposes. These benchmarks are also free of commercial agendas. While there are many examples of one-off benchmarks of this type, the Brown University survey has been published since 2001 (West, 2001 (West, , 2002 (West, , 2003 (West, , 2004 (West, , 2005 (West, , 2006 . It should be noted that while the headline data from the Brown University study are publicly available, detailed information must be purchased so, strictly speaking, this is not conventional academic research.
Third, there is the question of scope. This varies with benchmark and with time. Scope is determined by purpose. The scope of the eEurope report (discussed below) is set to meet the specific purpose of monitoring progress in certain aspects of e-government. The scope of the iQ Content report (Moore et al., 2005 ) is confined to information access on a relatively small number of sites. And so on. Scope also encompasses what might be called the frame. Some benchmarks are global, others confined to defined regions (such as the EU). In other cases, the logic for the countries benchmarked would appear to be driven by market, resource or other considerations. Accenture, for example, selects a number of countries for its studies, but does not explain the rationale for its choices although it does provide a good account of its methodology. Their choice of participating countries may, to some extent, reflect the company's presence in those countries or it may be their view of leading countries. Finally, there is the dimension of scale. Some benchmarks compare only two countries. Some attempt to cover the entire world of nation states. Between these two poles lie many possibilities. Combining this with scope, benchmarks can be considered as occupying a three/four-dimensional space (Figure 1) .
In summary, in looking at benchmarks, one is not dealing with a cohesive group of tools, but rather at an eclectic mixture of exercises undertaken in different ways for different purposes at different times by different people and with different audiences in mind. Against this background, the remainder of this article will further consider some of the conceptual problems in benchmarking, look at what this criticism implies for the eEurope benchmark and draw some conclusions with regard to the value of benchmarking as a worthwhile activity.
Conceptual issues in benchmarking
Some practical problems with benchmarking have already been identified. There are also subtler conceptual problems. A starting point for these is purpose. The first question in any benchmarking exercise is what is its purpose? What is the specific purpose of making comparisons with one's peers or making comparisons between countries? After all, governments can and do evaluate their own programmes (e-government and other) all the time, but only a minority of such evaluations involve benchmarks. As has been noted, a multi-nation benchmark is a large and potentially expensive exercise; there needs to be a business case.
The second question is what is to be measured? The answer to this depends on a number of factors including:
G The objective(s) of the benchmark; G The resources available; G The data available; G How easy those data are to access.
A third question is what type of benchmark is it? Benchmarks may be designed to measure or assess how closely something conforms to an established standard or to compare the performance of different systems or organizations. The 'something' may be a person, an organization, an artefact or, as in this discussion, a more abstract concept like e-government. In the latter two cases, there is always an implicit comparison of the performance of some underlying human agency, in this case governments or public administrations. Furthermore, benchmarks are constrained by the limitations of measurement and by the inadequacy of numeric scales when complex information needs to be conveyed. This is an inherent problem to which there is no simple answer. One approach is to use panels of experts to do the evaluation. This is not only time consuming and expensive, but it is open to all sorts of potential biases, not to mention contention. Much of the discussion of 'improving' benchmarks is based on finding a better, more representative set of indicators and/or altering the weightings. The fundamental difficulty with the whole process is not considered.
This can be seen when repetitive benchmarks are considered. Here there should at least be consistency year-on-year. Yet such surveys do not necessarily compare like with like because the benchmarking metrics change with time. This is particularly the case in the Accenture reports, but is also true of the eEurope reports. Accenture are quite open about this. Capgemini are less so and readers are sometimes left to infer for themselves that changes in the benchmark have taken place.
The symbiotic nature of benchmarking
Just to add a little more complexity to the mix, benchmarking of services is an evolutionary process because measurements and responses are related. By this is meant that countries and organizations may, and often will, adapt their behaviour to what is being measured. Consequently, the organization undertaking the benchmark will itself adjust its measurements to try to reduce the scope for respondents to 'play the system'. Benchmarking can, therefore, become something of a cat and mouse game between the benchmarking body and the entities being measured. This problem is worth looking at in more detail.
A key question in any benchmark is whether it is a public or a private exercise. The challenges of benchmark design are much greater when the results of a benchmark are available to third parties and in particular to the general public. Typically when an industry group decides to commission a benchmark, it will set up or employ an independent body to do the work. This body will report to each participant the overall result including averages, best performance and worst performance and their own performance. There are two important characteristics of such benchmarks which are different from public benchmarks:
G In such a situation there is little incentive to cheat by returning false data or bending the interpretation of questions.
G The benchmark is designed to the meet the consensus requirements of the participants because all participants will have been engaged in its design.
In contrast, consider the position with a public benchmark. There are many reasons for publishing public comparisons. A common one in recent decades is 'naming and shaming'. By showing that a hospital's standard of hygiene is poor or a school's examination results are below the national average, the public, and specifically politicians and newspaper editors, like to think that such organizations will be motivated to improve their performance. Such benchmarks are often dressed up in the form of citizen or consumer information and are often (as in the case of school league tables) grossly simplistic, if not downright misleading. Consequently, it is not uncommon that the benchmark is set up with a political objective in mind which may or may not be correct or appropriate for the institutions concerned. When such benchmarks are poorly designed, the law of unintended consequences can come back to bite the benchmark designers. It is a rare organization that does not feel pressure to respond to a poor showing or boast about a good one. For this reason, a good motto for public benchmark designers is to be careful of what you wish for, lest you get it.
Consider now the eEurope benchmark in this context. As outlined above, this benchmark uses four levels of sophistication. The better a country scores on the higher levels, the better its overall score. There are two likely impacts of this benchmark:
G First, because the benchmark is politically important and potentially economically important, countries will strive to score well. This is not to say that every country will design its e-government policy around scoring well on the benchmark, but it will inevitably affect thinking. Prima facie this may seem to be a good thing; the EU would like European countries to be more sophisticated (at least in the sense of 'sophisticated' as defined by the benchmark) and this will encourage them in that direction. Consider, however, the possibility that some countries may develop systems in such a way as to meet the benchmark rather than in the way that is best in terms of either technical design or citizen need. If, say, a fundamental re-design of a system is required, this may take several years during which the country will get a low score on this measure. There may be a temptation to throw something together quickly that looks good, but is relatively inefficient. As the benchmarkers can neither tell the difference nor detect the inefficiency, this policy will generally work, at least in the short term.
G Second, and more seriously, it is based on the assumption that the benchmarkers have their priorities right. What if they are misguided? This could have the effect of distorting e-government policy to the detriment of all citizens.
There is an argument that this may be true of the eEurope study. No attempt is made in this benchmark to measure either level of usage or customer satisfaction. It could be argued that, in the absence of such information, this benchmark has little or no credibility. The same can be said of the Brown benchmark and, up to 2004 at least, of the Accenture benchmark. The result is that countries build clever and impressive looking systems that people rarely use. In this context, it is interesting to note that in January 2007, the UK government proposed shutting down over 500 of its e-government web sites (Silicon.com, 2007) .
The consultancy firm iQ Content (Moore et al., 2005) make exactly this point. They argue that most ordinary citizens use e-government web sites for information not for transactions. There is a certain logic in this. Most transactions with government (at least for the individual citizen) occur once a year. Tax is the most obvious example, car and television licences are others. Many documents are renewed even less frequently. In some countries, a passport and a driving licence need only be renewed once every ten years. Some documents, such as death or birth (and in some cases marriage) certificates, are once in a lifetime events. The value to the state of being able to issue birth certificates on-line may be significant; the value to the individual citizen is modest and for childless citizens, may be nil. Furthermore, those members of the public who transact business with the government most regularly, such as people on social welfare, are least likely to undertake such transactions on-line as they often don't have access to the Internet or the necessary skills to use it (see Figure  2) . On the other hand, people look for information from the government all the time. Moore et al. argue that e-government resources should therefore be first put into making the design and content quality of web sites as high as possible. Instead, they say, governments pour money into complex and infrequently used transaction systems while information access is given little or no attention.
A further dimension of benchmarking is the motivation of the benchmarking sponsor. As has been noted, sponsors fall into four broad categories: supranational organizations such as the EU and the UN, individual governments, academic institutions and private firms. To consider just one of these, private firms have distinctly different reasons for undertaking benchmarking on their own behalf from any of the other three sources. The most obvious rationale for spending such large sums is to raise a firm's profile in the e-government marketplace. Accenture's reports, available free on-line or on request, are clearly in this category. Accenture will naturally be conscious of the marketing consequences of any comments that they make and this will affect the way that they report their findings. They are unlikely to publicly criticize a potential client, never mind an existing one. Other reports are produced for sale and are likely to be more detached, though they may still be influenced by expectations of customer reaction. Several examples of more blunt comments can be found in the report by Moore et al. (2005) . At one point they state that: 'eGovernment's dirty little secret has come to light -very few citizens are actually using these shiny new services ' (p. 20) . If this statement is true, it casts considerable doubt on the usefulness of benchmarks that encourage development of such underused services.
Finally, in the case of e-government, it is worth noting that different administrative and governance structures may affect a benchmark. In certain countries, for example, France, Ireland and the UK, government is relatively centralized so more services tend to be centrally provided. In other countries, Germany and the United States being two good examples, regional government, i.e. the Länder and the individual states, are much more powerful. A benchmark which fails to take account of these structural differences will inevitably be misleading.
A critique of the eEurope benchmarking exercise
In December 2000, as part of the Lisbon agenda, the EU Council adopted an e-government benchmark initially made up of 23 components and indicators. Later this was reduced to 20. In essence these indicators were designed to measure:
G the percentage of public services on-line; and G the extent of use of on-line public services for information access and completion of forms.
The approach selected focused on outputs and distinguished between services to business and services to citizens. It was decided that 20 services, 12 for citizens and eight for business, should be measured. A four-stage model of e-government maturity was to be used. The benchmark was to be an important tool in the eEurope programme the aims of which were: One of the 10 headings in this programme was Government on-line. Consequently, the eEurope benchmark measured only 'online front-end public services' (Cap Gemini et al., 2002: 3) , a stance which immediately narrowed the focus and created the risk, at least, of incentivizing governments to re-direct resources towards such services at the expense of other, deeper, but less visible, areas of e-government. The political aims, set out for government on-line in the programme, were fourfold, namely to:
G bring government services closer to the citizen; G reduce government expenditure by cutting bureaucracy and red tape;
G create jobs in value-added services providers; and G create better Europe-wide market information.
In e-government terms, these objectives were conventional and unambitious. There is mention of neither innovation, integration nor transformation to name but three items. It may be that the Commission felt that this was what was necessary at the time, but it did little to encourage riskier transformative and/or innovative projects and may well have led to some of these being shelved in order to score well on the benchmark metrics.
After a competitive tender, the contract to undertake these studies was awarded to Cap Gemini, Ernst & Young (now Capgemini) . For each measurement, data were gathered using a survey of web sites and a methodology developed by the consultants. Details of these are not publicly available, but they include a number of statistical sampling techniques and a detailed questionnaire to be filled in by each member state. The results of each benchmark are discussed and agreed with the relevant member states prior to publication.
Six measurements have been undertaken to date, the most recent of which was published in June 2006 and related to data collected in early 2006. This was the last in this series as it is now felt that this benchmark has served its purpose. At the time of writing, work is progressing on development of a new benchmark (Sakowicz, 2005) . The basic framework of 20 services has not changed over these six measurements although there have been some alterations in the structure and in the measures used. The initial survey was of 17 states, comprising the then 15 EU member states plus Iceland and Norway. The most recent survey included all (then) 25 EU states plus Iceland, Norway and Switzerland.
This benchmark has received wide publicity; it is sometimes front page news in several countries for a day or so when it is published. In the belief that perception is reality, governments have, unsurprisingly, used success in the benchmark to project a modern image of their country. While the benchmark was designed to show the rate of progress in Europe as a whole rather than to compare one state against another, politics being what it is, it is often the inter-state comparison that gets most attention. In its primary objective, the benchmark has been reasonably successful. It shows, clearly enough, the considerable progress made by the participating countries over the six-year period in the delivery of on-line services. But it has many deficiencies, some of which are generic to all benchmarks of this type and some of which are specific to this one. One of these is the collateral effects.
Critiques of this benchmark can be found in Kunstelj and Vintar (2004) and more specifically in Zuiderhoek and Bos (2006) . Both sets of authors suggest alternative approaches to this type of comparative evaluation. Kunstelj and Vintar propose a highly complex model of e-government evaluation, but they only hint at how this might be operationalized. While the model is impressive, using it as a basis for comparative measurement would be extremely difficult. Zuiderhoek and Bos concentrate their criticism on the eEurope study and suggest a number of improvements to it, designed to overcome the inherent weaknesses identified above. Both articles point out the absence of various key factors in the eEurope framework including the absence of any measure of demand or of progress in back office transformation or service integration.
One of the big weaknesses in the eEurope benchmark is that it only addresses services provided over the Internet to the general public. This means that many services which might, in a wider context, be considered e-government (such as SMS messaging, extranets or use of geographical information systems for planning) are not counted. More broadly, the concept and value of multi-channel electronic access to government is not considered. Even allowing for some debate as to what is meant by e-government, the definition implicit in the Capgemini benchmark is, as has been noted, a limited one. To be fair, Capgemini recognize that many components of e-government are omitted from their benchmark. Their 2005 report states (p. 8) that '. . . the results of this measurement should be integrated in a more holistic e-government measurement model'.
A further problem is that the research methodology is almost entirely based on looking at on-line services remotely. Unlike the approaches used by Accenture and others, techniques such as surveys, interviews, focus groups and so on are not used. The result is something that is easy to count, but ultimately superficial. There is no assessment at all of how often these services are used or of what users think of them. Nor are there any measures of how effective they are. One cannot but wonder how thorough the tests of on-line transaction sites can be when one is looking at several hundred of them in a relatively short period.
A third problem is that, in each country, a government 'expert' is consulted to ensure that definitions are consistent and comparisons are meaningful. Before the results are published, they are discussed in draft with the countries concerned. Inevitably there is some debate between the consultants' findings and the views of public servants in these countries so that what emerges contains almost certainly some element of negotiation.
A fourth problem is that some services have different meanings or implications in different jurisdictions and some services have no real equivalent in some countries (see below). Bearing in mind the remarks above about the complexities of combining between cost, scale and quality of information is a steep one. One possibility would be to supplement benchmarks with a small number of in-depth case studies. Another would be to commission consultancy reports which examine the absolute, rather than relative, levels of achievement of governments in the delivery of e-government. The problem with comparison is that it demands standardization and, as has been pointed out, standardization is not only never fully possible, but the attempt to enforce it can lead to undesirable side effects. Giving a team of independent consultants a brief to report on progress is, in itself, a compromise and has its own weaknesses, but it would mean that such a report could look at how governments are responding to the needs of their own citizens, rather than the needs as perceived by civil servants in Brussels or New York.
One of the questions posed earlier is particularly hard to answer. How does one take an enormously complex and complicated entity such as e-government (not to mention the information society) and score it? This is the criticism implied in the title of Janssen et al.'s article: 'If you measure it they will score'. The concept of piling such a complex range of operations, organizations, technology, services, politics and people into an overall score is, as Boyle (2001) points out, inherently questionable.
In 2005, a senior Irish civil servant was speaking on the subject of information security at a major public sector conference on e-government in Canada. The conference was attended by several people from Accenture who consistently rate Canada as one of the top two countries in their benchmarks. When he had finished, the chairman asked for questions from the floor. One person asked for the microphone. When he was handed it, he turned to the Accenture people present and said: 'My question is for Accenture. Have you ever heard of Ireland?' The purpose of telling this story is not to make a nationalistic point, but to highlight the simple fact that there are many thousands of things in e-government neither Accenture nor anybody else can hope to measure. One can only conclude that all benchmarks should, like cigarettes, carry a large health warning.
